Last Friday, we learned that President Trump had fired the Inspectors General (IGs) at 17 federal agencies. The firings were not conducted in accord with the Inspector General Act. Congress was not given the required 30-day advance notice or an explanation for the firings.
Congressional Democrats—and some Republicans—are now asking why Trump took this unexpected action. After all, Inspectors General are best known as watchdogs charged with finding fraud and abuse in government and making recommendations for agencies to be more efficient and effective.
I look forward to learning more about the firings but was prompted by the news to look at the recent work of the IG at the U.S. Department of Education. I chose Education because I followed the work of that Department’s IG for more than 30 years, as counsel to a Congressional Committee, as a lawyer representing clients with contracts with the Department, and as a lobbyist. Over the years, I came to respect the work of the Department’s IG. Reading the Semiannual reports of the IG, as well as the reports on fraud investigations and financial audits of the Department itself, was like reading the owner’s manual to the Department.
In talking to friends about why President Trump may have fired the IGs, I was struck with how little some friends knew about IGs and their value to good government. Some friends were surprised that I spoke favorably about IGs given that during my career some IG findings and recommendations were against the interests of my clients or simply recommendations with which I disagreed.
After a few discussions about the firing and the rampant speculation about why Trump decided to fire so many IGs at once without citing failures or deficiencies with any of them, I decided to write this week about IGs rather than about Trump’s decision to fire them.
Over the weekend, just before watching the Philadelphia Eagles embarrass the Washington Commanders, I read the final Semiannual Report of the ED Inspector General, issued just before President Biden left office. It is typical in terms of the focus and objectivity of most IG reports I have read over the years.
The report recites the mission of the IG office: “To identify and stop fraud, waste, and abuse; and promote accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness through our oversight of the Department’s programs and operations.”
In this report, the IG summarized the results of its operations during the six months between April 1 and September 30, 2024. The IG opened 21 investigative cases and closed 36, won 15 criminal convictions, collected $31.3 million in fines, restitution, and recoveries, submitted 18 audit-related reports, and made 69 recommendations for improving the Department’s operations.
A summary of one of the Department’s investigations reads: “The former Senior Director of Fiscal Services for the Magnolia School District in California was sentenced to prison for embezzling more than $16 million from the district over several years. The former official made unauthorized payments to themselves with district funds that were deposited into their personal bank account and spent on items such as a million-dollar home, an expensive car, luxury items, and cosmetic procedures.”
Examples of audit work conducted by the Department are harder to summarize. One example is an audit of the Department’s Performance Measures and Indicators for Returning Student Loan Borrowers to Repayment. The IG wrote: “We conducted an inspection to determine whether FSA [Office of Federal Student Aid] established performance measures and indicators for returning borrowers to repayment. We found that the FSA needed to establish effective performance measures and indicators to evaluate its performance for returning borrowers to repayment. Although the FSA and the Office of the Under Secretary established operational and strategic objectives and operational goals for returning borrowers to repayment, they were not written in specific and measurable terms. In addition, although FSA identified several data metrics as performance measures and indicators for returning borrowers to repayment, they did not include clearly defined targeted percentages, numerical values, milestones, or measurements.”
Why is this audit report notable? It objectively identifies deficiencies in FSAs operations that were not politically helpful to the political leadership of the Department—Democrats.
J.E. Dean writes on politics, government, and, too infrequently, other subjects. A former counsel on Capitol Hill and public affairs consultant, Dean also writes for Dean’s List on Medium and Dean’s Issues & Insights on Substack.
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